Review - Public Transport Reform Report

Below we publish a review of a transport reform plan drawn up by bus workers. It is the only document addressing the threat to public service and linking the interests of bus workers and working people at large. We believe it deserves further discussion and would welcome comment - Editor

Outline Business Case for Public Transport Reform. Final Report, Sept’ 2009. Produced by FGS McClure Watters.

In the recent Outline Business Case for Public Transport Reform Translink has been compared with seven other, all private, companies, three of which are owned by Arriva. This is an extensive and in-depth report with serious implications for the delivery of public transport in Northern Ireland and despite Conor Murphy’s assurances that he has “ruled out privatisation” the thrust of the report is towards opening the transport system up to access by large international private transport companies. This is a brief outline of some salient points.

According to this report company costs when averaged out per passenger are 45%-50% higher than Welsh or English comparators. This, it asserts, is only partially explained by the fact that Ulsterbus performs “a range of functions in-house which operators in Britain typically subcontract,” the implication being that the wage bill should be reduced by slimming down in house operations. Although it finds that “total driver costs account for a lower percentage of the company’s cost base than for operators in many parts of Great Britain, suggesting there are many positive features in how drivers are deployed” it goes on to assert that “The Translink companies’ cost per member of operating staff is higher than any of the other operators examined”, and, “Our analysis indicates that average weekly costs per driver in Northern Ireland are around 8% higher than in Great Britain.”

The report finds that; “In contrast to our analysis on Metro, Ulsterbus displays the worst performance of the reference group in terms of its ratio of non-operating staff to operating staff and also ranks among the worst performers on its number of non-operating staff per bus.” It goes on to point out that “If non-operating staff are paid more on average than operating staff, then reducing the proportion of non-operating staff Ulsterbus carries would tend to reduce overall average salary costs.” It finds that when compared with other, all private, transport companies, “Ulsterbus incurs the highest operating cost per member of operating staff of the group under consideration, some 27% above the average for the group…. With non-operating staff representing a larger proportion of overall headcount than for the benchmark operators.” The report proposes that; “bringing Ulsterbus’s salary cost per staff member down by 11% ….. Would involve annual operating cost savings of around £4.4m.” This has serious implications for white collar or clerical staff.

The summary of findings is explicit, it states that, “Ulsterbus would have to make large reductions in its cost base (specifically in relation to non-operating staff), as well as generating a significant increase in passenger numbers”. This does not mean that cuts will necessarily be focused on non-operating staff. The same summary goes on to say that increasing passenger levels and reducing the levels of non-operating staff would prove to be “extremely challenging” but that this “is not to say that meaningful savings could not be generated in the delivery of Ulsterbus’s services,” the question is, for the rank and file, operating or non-operating, where is the axe most likely to fall?

In an indication of where the report’s mindset feels that potential savings may be made the final word on the issue focuses on drivers’ wages. While it acknowledges that “total driver wage costs within both Ulsterbus and Metro are lower as a proportion of the companies’ total costs than is typical for the bus industry in Great Britain” it goes on to spell out that, “while hourly driver wage rates appear higher, there are many positive features to the manner in which Translink deploys drivers in delivering its services”. Term-time, part-time and single shift operations come highly recommended by this report which “suggests there is potential for further progress in this respect,” suggesting we should expect bus driving to become a predominantly part time occupation.

In relation to fleet size the report finds that, “The company’s ratio of buses per thousand of population is more than four times as high as the average for the comparators studied.” It suggests that if spare capacity, currently 15%, were brought down to 12% it would reduce the fleet by around 40 buses. This is a continuous theme throughout the report, which explicitly states that “Our discussions with the Department have consistently highlighted spare capacity in Metro and Ulsterbuses’ fleets as a key area for attention.” The number of drivers per bus is also highlighted as problematic with high peak time traffic being pinpointed as the reason that a large fleet must maintained for the school runs. The report’s greatest regret is that the information provided to it by Translink’s own study in 2008 does not help “to strip out the impact of school transport on the company’s business and efficiency programme.”

In a list of recommendations to the DRD for further action the obtaining of “more robust information on areas of the groups performance where we experienced a limitation of scope” sits at number one. The report seeks to isolate the key aspects of Translink’s income all the better to strip it down and privatise it, chunk by chunk, in accordance with the neo-liberal diktats on “liberalisation” and “competition”. Underpinning this strategy is a race to the bottom, in terms of wages, with a strong emphasis on benchmarking and performance comparisons with other bus companies who are to be invited by the DRD to express an interest in the local market. The DRD are recommended to “conduct a market testing exercise among a range of private operators to gauge their appetite for entering the Northern Ireland bus transport market”. This push for privatisation will see “not only members of the Federation of Passenger Transport” being approached but will also see “major groups in Great Britain such as First Group, Arriva and GoAhead, and potentially international operators such as Transdev and Veolia” being invited to express an interest in acquiring a share of the local transport market. All rank and file staff, operating and non-operating, should be aware of this report and be concerned about its proposals.

(1) Outline Business Case for Public Transport Reform, Chapter 20, Comparative Efficiency of Ulsterbus and Translink Bus Operations Combined. pp., 86-116.