Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose
No change in the Irish state following elections, but how long can it last?
5 December 2024
The general view in the aftermath of the Irish general election was that the ruling coalition had dodged a bullet. There was no mass outburst of rage against their policies and no emergence of a far-right party to destabilise society.
Of course, the big fear was that Ireland would follow much of Europe in experiencing a mass right-wing revolt by a new anti-migrant movement. That didn't happen. The closest result to such a shift was the strong showing of populist Gerry “The Monk” Hutch, leader of a well-known criminal family, in inner-city Dublin. A new party, Independent Ireland, gained four seats, but it is a constitutional party.
It is important to understand why the anticipated right-wing wave did not materialise. The violent gangs were relatively small. Last year’s riots in Dublin were magnified by media coverage, but the state and Garda took steps to address the unrest. They first conciliated with the gangs, later co-opted them into suppressing migrant rights by sweeping up migrant encampments and increasing deportations. Finally, they clamped down on right-wing actions and launched a coordinated publicity campaign to remind voters of the previous year's disorder.
The major parties all hardened their positions on migration. Even Sinn Féin shifted its stance, though it suffered politically from appearing too slow to change for some voters on the right and for compromising democratic principles according to voters on the left.
In an election marked by low turnout, the major coalition parties emerged to form a new government with largely unchanged policies. As is traditional, voters punished the smaller party in the three-way coalition. The Green Party, for the second time in recent history, was decimated, much like Labour in an earlier coalition. Labour is now only showing a slow recovery.
However, this does not mean that all is well. Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael saw declines in their vote shares, offset only by the low turnout. Most opposition parties, with the exception of Labour and the Social Democrats, either saw a decline or no significant change in their support.
Although Sinn Féin came second in terms of seats and third in terms of votes, it remains excluded from the new coalition by the traditional governing parties. Sinn Féin faces its own challenges: while it can claim a sharp recovery from recent local government elections, its vote share fell by 5.5 percent compared to the last general election.
Exit poll data highlighted housing and homelessness as the single biggest issue for voters, with 28 percent identifying it as their key concern. This was followed by cost of living at 19 percent, health at 17 percent, economic stability at 9 percent, and immigration at 6 percent.
How, then, did the Fine Gael–Fianna Fáil coalition secure victory?
A successful electoral programme requires not only policies but also credible strategies for implementing them. Despite years of failure, the government managed to convince voters that success in housing provision was imminent and that opposition alternatives were too risky or vague.
It is worth noting the absence of major political debates during the election. Economic dependency often leads to political dependency, and silence on contentious issues like Gaza or Ireland's quiet alignment with NATO was unsurprising.
The economic arguments also posed challenges for Sinn Féin. In December 2023, then-Taoiseach Leo Varadkar effectively dismantled Sinn Féin’s proposal for average Dublin house prices of €130,000 as unrealistic and likely to trigger financial collapse. Similarly, election manifestos from leftist Dublin parties, which focused on "affordable housing" within the private market, failed to inspire confidence.
The financial basis of Ireland’s economy—acting as a tax haven subservient to global financial capital—remained unchallenged, despite warnings from economists, including the government’s own oversight bodies, about the instability and recklessness of current policies.
The final vote shares for the top three parties were Fianna Fáil at 21.9 percent, Fine Gael at 20.8 percent, and Sinn Féin at 19.0 percent. While the coalition parties saw slight declines in their vote shares, voter turnout fell below 60 percent, reflecting a general dissatisfaction with the options available.
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, which once alternated as the dominant government parties, can no longer form a majority even when combined, despite significant vote transfers between their candidates. The real story of the election is the 5.5 percent drop in Sinn Féin’s vote compared to the last election. As Sinn Féin was positioned as the main alternative, this decline leaves no substantial challenge to the incoming government.
The results mean that in the new Dáil, Fianna Fáil will hold the most seats (48), followed by Sinn Féin (39) and Fine Gael (38). The Fianna Fáil/Fine Gael total of 86 seats is two short of a majority and around 10 short of a working majority. This shortfall can be resolved by including Labour or the Social Democrats or by gaining the support of independent TDs.
Ireland, once a very poor country, now appears wealthy—or at least home to a wealthy elite. However, the country remains deeply dependent on imperialist powers and financial capital, with hopes pinned on the trickle-down effect. The state’s bankruptcy and the Troika-imposed budget of 2011 are rarely mentioned. Under the current economic model, privatised housing and public services guarantee profits for the wealthy while grinding down the working class.
Immediately after the election, it was announced that corporate tax revenues had risen by 60 percent. At the same time, the Central Bank urged the public not to panic over the potential for global financial collapse and warned of rising interest rates.
Irish capitalism lacks an independent strategy and shows little interest in defending Irish workers. The true problem is the absence of anti-imperialist and socialist parties capable of mobilising effective opposition.